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THE JUSTICE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Louis B. NICHOLS*
During the past year, there are those who have declared open season
upon our military services. Headlines have appeared, often without
justification, demeaning our military men. The system of military
justice has frequently been singled out as a target, using an individual
situation as a vehicle to condemn a system, ofttimes under the banner of
seeking justice and preventing an infringement of individual rights.
To err is human and the military services, made up of humans, are
bound to make mistakes. But personal failures alone are not justification
to condemn a system.
It is unfortunately true that in our times successes seldom make
headlines. Only failures attract widespread public attention. It is the
author's firm conviction, arrived at after viewing our system of military
justice over a long span of time, that more progress has been made in
making justice a reality in the military than in practically any state in
the Union. To be sure, the administration of justice in the military has
been the subject of considerable discussion in the public forum.' This
article, therefore, has a threefold purpose: to discuss the need for a
separate system of criminal justice in the armed forces; to compare the
present system of military justice with comparable civilian systems and
with idealized standards; and to comment on proposals for improve-
ments and modifications in the system.
Historically, armies have been governed by military criminal codes
which did not apply to society at large, and they have used their own
tribunals for the trial of offenses.2 The Constitution of the United States
provides that Congress shall have power "To make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval forces . ... a This con-
stitutional provision has been interpreted as authorizing the enactment of
* J. D., George Washington University, 1934; Past Chairman, Criminal Law Section
of the American Bar Association.
1. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970); S. 4168-S. 4178, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970);
S. 3117, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 116 CoNG. REc. 13,400 (daily ed. Aug. 13, 1970);
116 CoNG. REc. 12,862 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1970); 116 CoNG. REc. 12,666 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1970); R. SHERRmL, MmITARY JusTIcE Is To JusTIcE As MILITARY Music Is To Music
(1970); Bishop, The Quality of Military Justice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1970, (Magazine),
at 32. See Moyer, Procedural Rights of the Military Accused: Advantages over a Civilian
Defendant, 22 MAINE L. REv. 105 (1970); Rothblatt, Military Justice or Injustice: The
Green Beret Case, 75 CASE AND CoMmENT 3 (July-August 1970).
2. See W. WINTHRoP, MLITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS, 17 et seq. (2d ed. 1920).
3. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
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a criminal code which applies only to the military and the creation of
a separate system of tribunals for the trial of these offenses.4 "Cases
arising in the land and naval forces" are expressly excepted from the
Fifth Amendment's provision requiring a grand jury presentment or
indictment for capital or infamous crimes, and, by implication, they
are excepted from the Sixth Amendment requirements for trial by jury.5
The Supreme Court has denied courts-martial jurisdiction only as to
persons and offenses without a sufficient military connection.6
Courts-martial were long viewed as "instrumentalities of the executive
power." 7 Military justice and courts-martial were considered to be
adjuncts to the commander's power and responsibility to maintain good
order and discipline-military law and order-and he possessed great
power over the military justice process."
In 1950, Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military JusticeY
Significant amendments to the Code were contained in the Military
Justice Act of 1968.10 Although military commanders still possess disci-
plinary powers," the system of military justice under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice has evolved to the point where it is a mature
and sophisticated system of justice.
NEED
The historical and constitutional bases for a military criminal code
and military justice system are buttressed by practical necessity. Crim-
4. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858).
5. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 262 (1969); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2, 123, 138-39 (1866).
6. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S.
281 (1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278
(1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
7. W. WirNrHRop, supra note 2, at 49.
8. For the basic proposition that a commander is responsible for the conduct of his
troops, see In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1946); see also art. 1, Annex to Fourth
Hague Convention of 1907, relating to the laws and customs of war on land that to be
recognized as a lawful belligerent, an armed force must be "commanded by a person
responsible for his subordinates.' As late as World War II, the commanding officer who
convened a court-martial could advise the court-members of his displeasure and non-
concurrence in an acquittal or in a finding of not guilty and could reflect this dis-
pleasure and nonconcurrence in the efficiency reports of the court-members. A MAN-
UAL FOR COURTS-MARTA L, U.S. ARMY 1928. This is no longer permitted. U irFoaM CODE
op MILITARY JusricE, art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]; MAX-
UAL FOR CoURTs-MARTAL, UnITED STATEs, 1969, 38 (Revised ed.) [hereinafter cited as
MCMI, enjoin acts to influence military courts, including their participants.
9. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970).
10. 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
11. See text accompanying notes 20-23 infra.
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inal law in civilian society generally has a preventive as well as a re-
habilitative function. It restricts antisocial behavior to enable people
to live together in accepted social patterns. The successful accomplish-
ment of a military mission requires more than prevention of antisocial
behavior; it requires absolute loyalty and a commitment found in few
other places in society. This loyalty and commitment are so important
to the society as a whole that the criminal law is used to make certain
it exists. Military law has a motivating as well as preventive function.
It not only must deter improper conduct, but also must promote an
attitude of respect for authority and adherence to discipline. Disci-
pline instills in a soldier a willingness to obey an order no matter how
unpleasant or dangerous the task to be performed. Discipline conditions
the soldier to perform his duty even if it requires him to act in a way
that is highly inconsistent with his basic instinct for self-preservation.
The need for discipline in the military justifies having military of-
fenses which have no counterpart in civilian life. In civilian life, if an
employee disobeys the instructions of his employer or is absent from
work, the potential consequences may be serious but not so serious
as to justify the imposition of criminal sanctions. The worker may be
fired or some other sanction may be applied. The potential conse-
quences of disobedience of an order or absence from duty in the mili-
tary are so great that criminal sanctions are often justified. And this is
true even in the peacetime or garrison situation because the soldier or
sailor never knows when his unit will be mobilized. If the soldier or
sailor believes that he can disobey an order or be absent from duty
without an excuse in peacetime, he may well believe he can do this in
war. Thus, the rationale for offenses such as desertion,'12 absence with-
out leave,' 3 missing movement,' 4 and failure to obey a lawful order 15
becomes apparent.
Inherent in the concept of discipline, and necessary for the accom-
plishment of the military mission, is a superior-subordinate relationship.
The exigencies of combat do not permit a plan of action to be debated
where decisions frequently must be made on a split second basis. A
military commander must have absolute confidence that his orders will
be obeyed. Disobedience of an order may result not only in danger to
the individual who disobeys, but also to the mission, the military unit,
12. UCMJ art. 85, 10 U.S.C. § 885 (1964).
13. Id. art. 86, 10 U.S.C. § 886 (1964).
14. Id. art. 87, 10 U.S.C. § 887 (1964).
15. Id. art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1964).
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and ultimately to the nation, to say nothing of his comrades whose very
lives might depend on the proper execution of an order. The superior
should have the respect and loyalty of his subordinates to ensure the
accomplishment of the military mission. Any conduct which detracts
from the respect toward, and confidence in the superior weakens his
authority, and certain military offenses are designed to assure obedience
by promoting respect. Thus, disrespect toward a superior commis-
sioned officer, 16 assaulting a superior commissioned officer,17 and insub-
ordinate conduct toward warrant officers, noncommissioned or petty
officers,' 8 are punished as criminal even though similar conduct in civilian
life might not be punishable at all. Necessity, therefore, dictates that
the military criminal code contain uniquely military offenses and that the
military possess its own judicial system capable of trying the accused
for alleged military offenses, and, in many situations, for civilian type
offenses.
All enlightened systems of criminal justice are concerned with the
rehabilitation of convicted offenders. Rehabilitation is extremely im-
portant for the military because manpower is its most precious asset.
The goal of rehabilitation imposes a heavy burden on the military justice
system because this goal is often in conflict with the goal of deterrence.
The civilian system of criminal justice, which is not faced with the
pressing requirement to return men to duty, has had little if any success
in attaining this goal of rehabilitation and, in fact, its almost total failure
in this regard represents a sad commentary on civilian justice.
The importance of preserving military manpower also means that the
system of military justice must operate with reasonable promptness.
Undue delay in the disposition of criminal cases is harmful to any sys-
tem. In the military, morale and discipline can be adversely affected
by delay. Equally important, needed manpower may be prevented from
performing its assigned mission. A separate system of military justice
allows speedier justice, because it is integrated into the operation of the
military as a whole.
A system of criminal justice must be an integral part of the armed
forces because they may be deployed anywhere in the world on short
notice. They cannot depend, for example, on United States criminal
courts which are many thousands of miles away and, for the most part,
16. Id. art. 89, 10 U.S.C. § 889 (1964).
17. Id. art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1964).
18. Id. art. 91, 10 U.S.C. § 891 (1964).
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already bogged down. The administration of justice must be possible
within a combat zone as well as on a peacetime installation.
A system of justice which is an integral part of the armed forces
permits American legal principles and our Constitution to follow our
servicemen wherever they are deployed. It permits our government to
enter into agreements with foreign governments so that American serv-
icemen accused of crimes in foreign countries may be tried according
to American, rather than foreign, principles of law.
Exercise of military jurisdiction over civilian type offenses has been
the subject of a recent Supreme Court decision and numerous journal
articles.19 Jurisdiction over civilian type offenses is required in foreign
areas and in numerous situations within our own country. The military
is a social community as well as a military organization. It must deal
with antisocial behavior in the same way that the civilian community
does. Antisocial behavior may occur on a military post isolated from a
civilian community and its courts. Because those on military posts often
live closer to one another than people in civilian communities, depend-
ence on civilian courts to understand and enforce the needs of the
military community appears unrealistic. A soldier who assaults another
soldier, for example, often can be rehabilitated and returned to duty
within a short period of time if his case can be handled locally and
processed rapidly. Ability to handle civilian type offenses also permits
the military accused to be available for duty or performing his duty
while awaiting trial.
COMPARISON
In order to compare military justice with civilian criminal justice,
it is necessary to understand the hierarchy of military tribunals and the
military concept of nonjudicial punishment. A military commander is
responsible for developing and maintaining good order and discipline
and a certain level of proficiency within his organization. Learning and
developing military discipline does not differ much from learning or
teaching any discipline, skill, or precept. In all learning, correction of
the learner is indispensable. How much and what type of correction
is used is part of the ability to teach and part of what is called leadership
19. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969). See, e.g., Nelson & Westbrook,
Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis of
O'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1969); Note, Constitutional Law: Non-Mili-
tary Offense Connitted Off Post While on Leave Not Justiciable by Court-Martial, 18
KAN. L. REv. 335 (1970).
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in the military. The military commander needs the widest possible
authority to correct individuals, but some types of corrective action are
recognized as being so severe that they should not be entrusted solely
to the discretion of one individual. The system of military justice recog-
nizes the commander's need to have some method of imposing minor
punishment, as differentiated from other forms of corrective action, with
few procedural technicalities. Starting with punishment under Article
1 52 of the Code and progressing to the general court-martial, individual
discretion is more and more circumscribed and procedural safeguards
are elaborated as maximum punishments increase. Under Article 15, the
commander may impose, for minor offenses, forfeitures of Y2 month's
pay for two months, reduction in rank, restriction, and correctional
custody. Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is not a conviction
for purposes of civil service and other job applications or for any other
purposes in civilian life. The accused may refuse this punishment and
demand trial by court-martial in all but rare circumstances. 2 1 Procedures
for presenting evidence in defense, mitigation, and extenuation are pro-
vided,22 as are procedures for appealing the punishment.2 3 It is clear
that the adversary system does not exist under Article 15, but the
punishments are minor, the punishment is not a conviction of record,
and avenues of appeal are provided. It is analogous to the civilian pro-
cedure of permitting forfeiture of collateral.
The summary court-martial is a trial by one commissioned officer who
need not be a lawyer. If the accused is convicted, it will be a convic-
tion of record. Punishment may include confinement up to forty-five
days and may include reduction in grade and forfeitures not to exceed
2/3 of one month's pay.24 No counsel is furnished for the accused or
the prosecution, but the accused is advised of his legal rights and that he
may refuse trial by summary court-martial. 25 Trial by summary court-
20. UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (Supp. V, 1970), setting forth in minute detail the
commanding officer's authority for nonjudicial punishment for minor infractions under
regulations prescribed by the President and the Secretaries of the military departments.
21. Id. art. 15(a), 10 U.S.C. § 815(a) (1964).
22. See, e.g., Army Regulation 27-10, ch. 3 (Nov. 26, 1968) [hereinafter cited as AR].
Although counsel is not appointed to represent the accused, the accused may, and fre-
quently does confer with a judge advocate before agreeing to accept the punishment.
23. UCMJ art. 15, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (e) (Supp. V, 1970).
24. Id. art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. V, 1970).
25. Id. While counsel is not routinely appointed, the accused frequently confers with
legal counsel prior to accepting trial, and may have retained counsel to represent him at
the trial.
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martial has many of the attributes of trial by a justice of the peace or
a federal magistrate. 26
Although the special and general court-martial will be discussed in
more detail later, a brief statement is warranted at this point. The spe-
cial court-martial may impose confinement not to exceed six months,
forfeiture of 2/3 pay for a like period, reduction in rank, and, under
certain circumstances, a bad conduct discharge.27 The general court-
martial may impose any punishment permitted under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice including, for appropriate offenses, death, life im-
prisonment, dishonorable discharge, or dismissal in the case of officers.28
Civilian criminal justice systems provide a standard for comparison
in discussing the administration of military justice. There is a tendency,
however, to accept the civilian model as an ideal. Our constitutional
and statutory provisions on criminal trials have proved generally work-
able, fair, and effective over the course of our history. But it would be
erroneous to condemn a system of criminal justice simply because it
differed from that standard, particularly where it also has constitutional
underpinnings.29 A committee of the American Bar Association in its
project on Standards for Criminal Justice has attempted to formulate
a set of standards which outline what a system of criminal justice ought
to be. The standards represent the thinking of experienced legal minds,
including those of defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges. Many of
the standards have been adopted by the American Bar Association.
The objectivity of a comparison of the military justice system with
civilian criminal justice is increased by also comparing military justice
with these standards. In fact, the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
far ahead of our fifty states, has already adopted most of the applicable
standards by amendments to the Military Justice Act of 1968.
26. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401, 3402 (Supp. V, 1970).
27. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (Supp. V, 1970).
28. Id. art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. V, 1970). The punitive articles of the UCMJ
generally state that punishment shall be as a court-martial may direct. An exception
involves such offenses as murder and mutiny where the death penalty is specifically
stated to be a possible punishment. UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1964) provides that
punishment which a court-martial may direct for an offense may not exceed such limits
as the President may prescribe for that offense. Presidential limits are prescribed by
Executive Order in the form of the Manual for Courts-Martial. MCM 127c sets out
the table of maximum punishments for offenses. The death penalty may not be pre-
scribed by the President for an offense unless authorized by the Code.
29. See notes 3-5 supra and accompanying text.
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General
In the military, as in our civilian courts, the burden of proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt is on the prosecution. The Fifth Amend-
ment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination applies in mili-
tary courts and is buttressed by an article of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice ° which has been interpreted by the Court of Military
Appeals to encompass even broader protections than the Fifth Amend-
ment.31 The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is also guaranteed
in the military, 2 and the period of delay tolerated is considerably
shorter than in civilian practice. 3
Right to Counsel
The commentary on the Standards Relating to Providing Defense
Services drafted by the American Bar Association's project on Mini-
mum Standards for Criminal Justice begins:
Representation by counsel is crucial to the effectuation of all the
other procedural protections which the legal system offers to the
defendant. If those protections are to be meaningful and not
merely a sham, it is essential that each defendant have legal assist-
ance to realize their intended benefits.8 4
The American Bar Association standards recommend that counsel be
provided for indigent defendants for all offenses which are punishable
by "loss of liberty, except those types of offenses for which such pun-
ishment is not likely to be imposed ... ." 35 These standards go beyond
the rule currently prevailing in most jurisdictions. The Supreme Court
has denied certiorari in cases raising the right to counsel issue in the
misdemeanor setting. 6 One federal circuit court has stated that a right
30. UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Mewborn, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 431, 38 C.M.R. 229 (1968);
United States v. White, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 38 C.M.R. 9 (1967). See Moyer, supra note
1, at 125-26.
32. UCMJ art. 10, 10 U.S.C. § 810 (1964).
33. See Moyer, supra note 1 at 117-20. See generally, ABA PRoJECT ON MINIMum
STANDaRDS FOR CarINAL JusTIcE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY TRLAX (Approved
Draft 1968).
34. ABA PRojECT ON MrMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
To PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 13 (Approved Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as Paovw-
ING DEFENSE SERVICES].
35. Id. at 9 (Standard 4.1).
36. See, e.g., Beck v. Winters, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 963
(1969).
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to free counsel exists in a situation where the possible punishment is
imprisonment for less than six monthsY.3  However, the general rule is
to the contrary.38 The military rule is significantly more liberal than
that followed in most jurisdictions and even surpasses the American
Bar Association standard in one important respect: in the military,
counsel is provided without regard to the financial situation of the
accused. An accused, otherwise entitled to have counsel appointed for
him, may have such counsel even if he can afford to hire his own lawyer
and even if he, in fact, does hire one. In the general court-martial,
every accused is furnished a lawyer, who must be a member of the bar
certified for duty by The Judge Advocate General of an armed force,
regardless of the offense for which he is being tried and the possible
maximum punishment.89 This rule has been followed in the military
since the enactment of the Uniform Code in 1950. The military right
to counsel was expanded on August 1, 1969, the effective date of the
37. MacDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
38. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964), as amended (Supp. V, 1970). This section pro-
vides for the establishment of plans for the provision of counsel in all cases other than
those involving petty offenses as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1, i.e., those involving possible
punishment in excess of six months in jail, or a $500 fine, or both.
39. UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (Supp. V, 1970). Judge advocates must be mem-
bers of the bar admitted to practice before they enter active duty. Their academic
records and personal qualifications are carefully screened before they are accepted for
commissioning as military lawyers. Army judge advocates attend The Judge Advocate
General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia, before their first assignment, for a course
covering all aspects of military practice with emphasis on military justice, particularly
trial practice and advocacy before courts-martial. Navy and Marine judge advocates
attend a similar course at the Naval Justice School, Newport, Rhode Island, and Air
Force judge advocates attend a military law course at the Air University, Maxwell Air
Force Base, Montgomery, Alabama. In January 1, 1971, the following numbers of
judge advocates were on duty with the services: Army-1777, Air Force-1205, Navy-
766, Marine Corps-364. For fiscal year 1969, the court-martial case load of the services
was as follows (Source: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COMA A.D TJAG OF THE ARMED
FORCES, AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DOD, FOR 1969):
Army Air Force Navy & MC
Summary Courts Martial ............... 14,241 755 13,078
Special Courts-Martial .................. 59,597 1,733 16,239
General Courts-Martial ................. 2,482 301 929
72,243 2,789 30,246
The JAG Corps' conduct courses and instructional seminars for their lawyers. Army
career lawyers, for example, are generally required to attend a one-year military law
course at the JAG School, Charlottesville, Virginia. Military lawyers from the other
services may also attend this course. The Judge Advocate General's School also conducts
resident and correspondence courses for active duty and reserve military lawyers in
many specialized legal areas.
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Military Justice Act of 1968.40 In all special courts-martial which may
render a punitive discharge, the rule for general courts-martial is now
followed.41 In other special courts-martial, the accused must be in-
formed of his right to request that he be represented by a qualified
lawyer and must be provided with such counsel if he so requests, unless
qualified counsel cannot be obtained because of physical or military
conditions.42 This exception was provided to permit trial by court-
martial on board ships or at isolated locations where counsel could not
be obtained. The legislative history indicates that the exception is to
be narrowly construed.43 The Manual for Courts-Martial implements
this view 44 and some of the service regulations have taken an even
narrower approach. In the Army, for example, the exception is not
available within the United States, and outside the United States is
available only after attempts to obtain counsel from higher commands
have failed.45 Counsel are not provided for summary courts-martial
where loss of liberty is possible,46 but the accused may refuse trial by
summary court-martial. This right of refusal effectively gives the ac-
cused the right to legal counsel in these cases since he may have coun-
sel in the event he is tried by special court-martial. 47 It should be kept
in mind that the maximum punishment which may be adjudged by a
special court-martial is six months' confinement, and for many offenses
the maximum punishment is significantly less.48 Military counsel com-
pare quite favorably with public defenders who represent accused.
They are familiar with the criminal law and, after a few months of
service, generally have more trial experience than the average civilian
lawyer. The military system of providing counsel is superior to systems
which assign members of the bar without regard to their criminal law
experience and often compensate them inadequately.49
Right to Counsel in Pretrial and Post-trial Proceedings
The right to counsel has been extended by the Supreme Court not
40. UCMJ art. 27(c), 82 Stat. 1335, 1337 (1968), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
41. Id. art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (Supp. V, 1970).
42. Id. art. 27(c), 10 U.S.C. § 827(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
43. S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1968).
44. MCM 6c.
45. AR 27-10, para. 2-14 (May 27, 1969).
46. See notes 24, 25 supra and accompanying text.
47. UCMJ art. 20, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (Supp. V, 1970).
48. See, MCM 127c.
49. See generally PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, supra note 34. See also note 39, supra.
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only to less and less serious offenses,5" but also in time, prior to and after
the trial itself.5 The American Bar Association standards recommend
that counsel be appointed for an accused as soon as is feasible after he
is taken into custody.52 The rule of Escobedo v. Il1inoisr 3 which re-
quires that a suspect being interrogated be allowed to consult with his
lawyer if he desires, has been followed in the military since 1957.11
Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 5 since 1951 has pro-
vided that prior to questioning, an accused must be advised of the
offenses of which he is suspected, that he has a right to remain silent,
and that anything he says may be used against him. In 1966, the Su-
preme Court in Miranda v. Arizona56 held that prior to custodial interro-
gation an accused must be advised of his right to have counsel present
at the interrogation and that counsel would be provided if he could
not afford one. In United States v. Tempia,5 7 the Court of Military
Appeals applied this counsel requirement to the military. Since indi-
gency is not a requirement for provision of counsel in the military, the
latter part of the Miranda holding was unnecessary in the military.
Military accused are told that military counsel will be provided for
them and that they may hire civilian counsel.58 With the addition of
the Miranda counsel requirement, the Article 31 warning has become
broader than its civilian equivalent. The warning must be given to an
accused before an official may question him or request any statement.
It thus encompasses some situations which are not included in custodial
interrogation. 59 The Article 31 requirement that an accused be advised
of the offense or offenses of which he is suspected allows an accused
to answer questions more intelligently.
The American Bar Association has recommended that counsel be
provided at every stage of the proceedings, including sentencing, appeal,
50. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
51. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963).
52. PaovDiNG DEFENSE SERViCES, supra note 34, at 9 (Standard 5.1).
53. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
54. See Uxiied States v. Rose, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 441, 24 C.M.R. 251 (1957); United States
v. Gunnels, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 130, 23 C.M.R. 354 (1957).
55. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964).
56. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
57. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
58. Army Graphic Training Aid 19-6-1, Procedure for Informing Accused or Suspect
Person of His Rights (Sept. 1, 1967).
59. UCMJ art. 31(b), 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (1964); see, e.g., United States v. Souder,
11 U.S.C.M.A. 59, 28 C.M.R. 283 (1959).
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and post-conviction review.6" Every general court-martial conviction
which results in a punitive discharge or confinement for one year or
more is automatically reviewed by a service Court of Military Review.
61
Every special court-martial conviction which adjudges a bad conduct
discharge is also reviewed automatically by a Court of Military Review.
In some of these cases, further review by the United States Court of
Military Appeals is mandatory; in the remainder it is discretionary with
that court.62 In all of these situations, the accused may have a lawyer
free of charge, regardless of his financial status, to represent him on
appeal.63 Decisions of the Supreme Court require the appointment of
counsel for the appeal of indigent defendants. 64 The American Bar
Association standards further recommend that "[c] ounsel initially ap-
pointed should continue to represent the defendant through all stages
of the proceedings unless a new appointment is made because geograph-
ical considerations or other factors make it necessary." 65 In the military,
representation before the Courts of Military Review and the Court of
Military Appeals is generally by a lawyer officer assigned to a service
appellate review activity and not by the counsel who defended the
accused at trial. This arrangement is necessitated by the location of
these courts in the Washington, D. C. area. Representation on appeal
by a different counsel may provide better representation. An appellate
counsel who did not try the case will be willing, where appropriate,
to attack the adequacy of the representation at the trial.6 The Uniform
Code clearly provides that the duties of counsel do not end with the
trial. Article 38 (c) 67 provides that
[in every court-martial proceeding, the defense counsel may,
in the event of conviction, forward for attachment to the record
of proceedings a brief of such matters as he feels should be con-
sidered in behalf of an accused on review, including any objection
to the contents of the record which he considers appropriate.
In recent legislation, proposals have been made that military coun-
sel be permitted to represent military accused in collateral proceedings
60. PRovIDING DEFENSE SERviCES supra note 34, at 10 (Standard 5.2).
61. UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
62. Id. art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (Supp. V, 1970).
63. Id. art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (Supp. V, 1970).
64. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
65. PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES supra note 34, at 10 (Standard 5.2).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Broy, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 419, 34 C.M.R. 199 (1964).
67. UCMJ art. 38(c), 10 U.S.C. § 838(c) (1964).
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outside the military justice system.68 Military counsel already represent
accused on habeas corpus and other extraordinary writ proceedings to
the Court of Military Appeals."9 It is believed that few situations should
warrant relief outside the military justice system, but it should be avail-
able where counsel believe it necessary.
Pretrial Procedures
The Fifth Amendment specifically exempts cases arising in the land
and naval forces from the provisions relating to grand jury indictment
or presentment.7 ° Military justice has been criticized because it does
not embody a grand jury procedure. 71 Military procedure does provide
for a pretrial investigation which in many respects is superior to a
grand jury. Such a procedure is required before every general court-
martial. 72 Before the actual investigation takes place, the accused is
formally notified of the charges to be investigated, of the identity of
the accuser, and of the witnesses expected to be called.73 The accused
has the right to be present during the entire investigation, to have mili-
tary counsel appointed for him, and to hire his own civilian counsel.
74
If the case goes to trial, the accused is provided with a copy of the
formal investigation report, including statements of testimony taken and
other material considered by the investigating officer.
75
The investigating officer is generally a layman (as are members of
grand juries), but he may be a lawyer.7  He investigates the matters
set forth in the formal charges to determine their truth.77 In addition,
the investigating officer recommends appropriate disposition of the
charges: trial by general, special, or summary court-martial; Article 15
punishment; or other recommendation.7s The Manual for Courts-Mar-
tial specifically provides that the investigating officer's recommendation
68. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., § 2 (1970) (proposed UCMJ art. 38(c)).
69. UCMJ art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (Supp. V, 1970). See Noyd v. Bond, 295 U.S.
683 (1969) (recognizing the power of the Court of Military Appeals to issue extraordi-
nary writs).
70. See note 5, supra, and accompanying text.
71. See generally, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
72. UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
73. Id.; MCM 34b.
74. UCMJ art. 32(b), 10 U.S.C. § 832(b) (1964).
75. Id.
76. MCM 34a.
77. Id.
78. Id.
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is not binding.79 The authority who is charged with convening courts-
martial may disagree with the investigating officer's recommendation.
Grand jury procedures are significantly less favorable to an accused.
Federal and state grand jury proceedings are generally secret.80 The
accused has no right to be present at the grand jury proceedings, and
hence no right to be represented by counsel or to cross-examine wit-
nesses or present his own evidence."- It has long been held that states
are not required to commence the criminal process by grand jury
indictment8 2 and may employ some equally fair alternative procedure.
Even federal prosecutions for minor offenses are not required to proceed
by grand jury indictment."'
The Article 32 investigation has been praised by some who have
harshly criticized other features of the military justice system.8 4 A re-
cent legislative proposal has suggested extending a variation of it to
all courts-martial."5
Discovery
In the Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial
(Tentative Draft), the American Bar Association Project on Standards
for Criminal Justice recommends "more permissive discovery practices"
than provided in most jurisdictions in the United States.86 The Advisory
Committee on the draft felt that broad pretrial disclosure of the prose-
cution's case was the key to satisfying procedural objectives of over-
riding significance to criminal justice.8 7 Among the goals of full pre-
trial discovery are providing the accused sufficient information to make
an informed plea, permitting thorough preparation and minimizing sur-
prise at trial, and effecting economies in time and money.8
Military discovery is almost unlimited and comes nearest to the
American Bar Association standards. The Article 32 investigation
serves as an excellent discovery device in the general court-martial. In
79. Id. 35.
80. See, e.g., FED. R. Cum. P. 6(e); see Moyer, supra note 1, at 110.
81. See, e.g., FED. R. CGm. P. 6(d); see Moyer, supra note 1, at 111.
82. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
83. Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937).
84. Rothblatt, supra note 1, at 3; Sherman, Military Injustice, 74 CAsE AND ComjV.NT
44 (July-August 1968).
85. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 2 (1970).
86. ABA PRojEcr ON MINMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JusncE, STADARs REILAnN
TO DISCOVERY AND PRocEDUR BEFORE TRAL 1 (Tentative Draft 1969).
87. Id. at 2.
88. ld. at 11 (Standard 1.1).
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producing its case, the government will reveal its documentary and
real evidence and its witnesses, and the witnesses may be cross-examined
under oath. 9 In all courts-martial, the defense is furnished with a list
of persons chosen to serve as members of the court panel, the names
of witnesses to be called by the prosecution, and all documentary and
real evidence to be introduced. 9° Thus, the defense has the opportunity
to interview all witnesses and review all the evidence prior to trial.91
The defense also is given the opportunity to inspect the entire case file,
statements of interviewed witnesses, and the original report of investi-
gation.92
These rights should be compared with those prevailing in the fed-
eral courts, whose discovery procedures are substantially more liberal
than those obtaining in most states. 93 In federal practice, there is a right
to very limited disclosure of grand jury proceedings. 94 Real and docu-
mentary evidence and other items that are known to the defense may
be subpoenaed.9 5 The accused may examine written or recorded state-
ments made by him, medical and scientific test results, and his own
recorded testimony before a grand jury.96 He may also inspect and copy
"books, papers, documents, tangible objects, buildings or places which
are within the possession, custody, or control of the Government, upon
a showing of a materiality to the preparation of his defense and that the
request is reasonable." 97 Discovery under this rule is clearly not un-
89. See note 75 supra, and accompanying text.
90. MCM 44h.91. /d. % 34d, 115c.
92. MCM 44h. In seeking acceptance of the ABA Standards on Pretrial Discovery,
the extent of discovery is often frustrated by fear of misuse of information furnished.
This misuse does not occur between lawyers motivated by high ethical considerations.
Information involving important national security matters, for example, must be pro-
tected. The purpose of disclosure is to prepare for trial and has as its objective the
establishment of truth. Disclosure was never intended to enable counsel to seek head-
lines in advance of trial (see DR 7-107 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility,
which flatly prohibits such conduct). If information disclosed is prematurely released
or improperly used, sentiment could very well crystallize on restricting disclosure.
Congress in enacting the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 in Title VII recognized
the inability to protect information disclosed even under court rule, and modified the
ruling in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1968), by providing for in camera
inspection of specified material to determine relevancy to the defense. See S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 64-68 (1968); H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 51-52
(1969).
93. See generally Moyer, supra note 1, at 114-16.
94. Fm. R. CRIM. P. 6 (e).
95. Id. 17.
96. Id. 16.
97. Id. 16(b).
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limited. Discretion remains in the trial court to deny discovery in cer-
tain situations,98 and the accused subjects himself to discovery by using
the rule; production by the government can be made contingent upon
disclosure by the accused.9
Witnesses
Some criticism of the military justice system has been directed at the
procedures by which the defense secures process for obtaining evidence
and witnesses. Article 46 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice pro-
vides that the trial counsel, defense counsel, and court-martial shall
have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses and other evidence.'
Paragraph 115 of the Manual for Courts-Martial provides that requests
for witnesses by the defense are submitted to and acted upon by the
trial counsel. It is this paragraph which forms the basis for complaints
about the military process. It provides that
... when there is disagreement between the trial counsel and the
defense counsel as to whether the testimony of a witness so re-
quested would be necessary, the matter will be referred for deci-
sion to the convening authority or the military judge or the presi-
dent of a special court-martial without a military judge according
to whether the question arises before or after the trial begins....
If the convening authority determines that the witness will not be
required to attend the trial, the request may be renewed at the
trial for determination by the military judge or the president of
the special court-martial without a military judge....
Recently introduced bills have proposed that witness requests be sub-
mitted to the military judge rather than the trial counsel, ostensibly
to eliminate the process of having the prosecution approve requests for
defense witnesses.1 1 Criticism of this aspect of military justice is
without foundation. The Court of Military Appeals has held that an
accused is entitled to personal appearance at trial of all material wit-
nesses. 10 2 Since requests for witnesses which are contested are ulti-
98. See Meyer v. United States, 396 F.2d 279 (8th Cir. 1968); HemphlU v. United
States, 392 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1968).
99. FED. R. CGiM. P. 16(c).
100. 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1964).
101. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., § 2 (1970); S. 4175, 91st Cong, 2d Sess., § 1 (1970).
102. United States v. Sweeny, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964); United
States v. Hawkins, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 19 C.M.R. 261 (1955).
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mately passed upon by the military judge, 03 it is clear that the submis-
sion to the trial counsel is merely a procedural device. It must be kept
in mind that all these procedures deal only with witnesses for whom
the defense desires to use compulsory process, which in the military
involves the funding by the government of all expenses, including costs
of service, travel expenses, food and lodging allowances, daily attend-
ance fees, and expert witness fees.1 4 All these expenses are borne by
the government without regard to the accused's financial status, the
number of witnesses, or the distances involved. In addition, nationwide
service of process is available for civilian witnesses; °5 military witnesses
may be brought from anywhere in the world. A requirement that a
witness' testimony be shown to be material is not unreasonable since
costs are borne by the government. A similar requirement prevails in
federal practice. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b),
when the government bears the expense of producing a defense wit-
ness, the defense must demonstrate that the presence of the witness is
necessary to an adequate defense. None of those procedures precludes
military defense counsel from producing a witness on his own and
attempting to demonstrate the materiality of his testimony.
Appellate Review
Appellate review in the military is provided at least once after every
court-martial conviction and at no cost to the accused. Every convic-
tion by summary court-martial and special court-martial which does
not include a punitive discharge is reviewed for legal sufficiency by
the convening authority and by a lawyer. 6 The convening authority
may mitigate the sentence of the court-martial and may disapprove
findings because of legal errors. 0 7 If the special court-martial sentence
includes a bad conduct discharge, the review is more extensive. The
case is reviewed by the officer who convened the court and by the
officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction after he has received
the written advice of his legal officer.00 Both convening authorities
103. MCM 115.
104. Id.
105. UCMJ art. 46, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1964).
106. Id. art. 65(c), 10 U.S.C. § 865(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
107. Id. art. 64, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (Supp. V, 1970).
108. Id. arts. 61, 65, 10 U.S.C. §§ 861, 865 (Supp. V, 1970). In the Army, a special
court-martial which may adjudge a Bad Conduct Discharge must be convened by a
general court-martial convening authority. AR 27-10, para. 2-16 (May 27, 1969). In
these cases only the initial convening authority and his judge advocate perform the field
review.
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may mitigate the sentence and disapprove the findings on the basis of
legal errors. After these reviews, if the bad conduct discharge has been
approved, the case is reviewed automatically by the Court of Military
Review of the service of which the accused is a member.1 9 The Court
of Military Review may sit in panels of three judges."' The accused
is entitled to representation by a military lawyer free of charge and is
provided with a transcript of his trial."'
In general courts-martial the conviction is reviewed by the convening
authority after he receives the advice of his legal officer." 2 The con-
vening authority may disapprove the findings or a part thereof if legal
errors are found and may mitigate the sentence. If the approved sen-
tence does not include a punitive discharge or confinement for one year
or more, the case is then reviewed in the Office of The Judge Advocate
General and if found unsupported in law or if The Judge Advocate
General so directs, the case is reviewed by the Court of Military Re-
view." 3 Cases involving punitive discharges, a year or more confine-
ment, or a general or flag officer are reviewed automatically by the
Court of Military Review." 4 When the case is reviewed by the Court
of Military Review, the accused is provided with a lawyer" 5 and a
transcript of the trial." 6 If the accused is a general or flag officer, or if
the approved sentence extends to death, the case must be reviewed by
the civilian United States Court of Military Appeals and the sentence
cannot be executed until approved by the President." 7
In addition to the automatic appellate rights detailed above, a military
accused has certain appellate procedures which he may pursue on his
own initiative. Article 69 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice" 8
permits an accused, convicted by summary court-martial or special
court-martial which did not adjudge a bad conduct discharge (and thus
was not reviewed by a Court of Military Review), to petition The
109. UCMJ art. 66(b), 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
110. Id. art. 66(a), 10 U.S.C. § 866(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
111. MCM 82g(1), 102a, 102b.
112. UCMJ art. 61, 10 U.S.C. § 861 (1964).
113. Id. art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (Supp. V, 1970).
114. Id. art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (Supp. V, 1970).
115. Id. art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (Supp. V, 1970).
116. MCM 82g(1).
117. UCMJ arts. 67(b)(1), 71(a), 10 U.S.C. §§ 867(b) (1), 871(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
Judges of the Court of Military Appeals are appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate for 15-year terms. Judges are appointed from "civil life."
UCMJ art. 67(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (Supp. V, 1970).
118. Id. art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (Supp. V, 1970).
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Judge Advocate General for a review of his case. An accused under
Article 73119 is permitted to petition The Judge Advocate General for
a new trial within two years of his conviction on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence or fraud on the court. In a case reviewed by the
Court of Military Review, the accused may petition the United States
Court of Military Appeals for review. He will be provided with mili-
tary counsel free of charge for the preparation of the petition and for
the actual review.12°
Appellate review in the military is significantly different from that
found in most civilian jurisdictions. First, every authority who reviews
a conviction up through the Court of Military Review must be con-
vinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.' 2' The
reviewing authority is obligated to fully weigh the evidence and judge
the credibility of witnesses. Review can only work to the advantage of
the accused, except for appeal of questions of law certified from a Court
of Military Review to the Court of Military Appeals.
Military law also includes provision for appellate review of sentences.
In the Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, the Amer-
ican Bar Association strongly recommends provision for appellate review
of sentences, and notes that it is now available only in a minority of
jurisdictions. 22 The purposes of appellate review of sentences, as stated
in the American Bar Association standards, are the correction of exces-
sive sentences, facilitation of rehabilitation by affording the offender an
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence,
promotion of respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing, and
the promotion of just and rational sentencing. 123
In the military, sentences may only be adjusted downward by the
reviewing authority. The American Bar Association standards are
equivocal on this point. 24 One of the alternative ABA standards would
allow the reviewing court to increase the sentence, but only when sen-
tence review is initiated by the defendant.2 5
119. Id. art. 73, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (Supp. V, 1970).
120. Id. art. 70, 10 U.S.C. § 870 (Supp. V, 1970).
121. See, United States v. Arthur, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 81, 25 C.M.R. 343 (1968); United
States v. Acker, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 80, 25 C.M.R. 342 (1958); MCM 86b(1) (c), 100a.
122. ABA PaojEcr oN MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING To APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES 13 (Approved Draft 1968).
123. Id. at 21 (Standard 1.2).
124. APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES, AMENDMENTS RECOMMENDED BY THE SPECIAL
CoMMITTEE ON MImNMUM STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(March 1968).
125. Id. at 2.
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Bail
With the enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968, military
criminal law now has provisions for release from confinement which
parallel civilian provisions for release on bail. None of these provisions
require posting of collateral or bond. Military law has long had provi-
sions which permit an accused to be free from confinement pending
trial. Paragraph 20c of the Manual for Courts-Martial provides that
"confinement will not be imposed pending trial unless deemed necessary
to insure the presence of the accused at the trial or because of the
seriousness of the offense."
Prior to enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968, no specific
procedure existed for releasing persons from confinement pending ap-
pellate review of their convictions. Commanders were reluctant to re-
lease convicts from confinement pending appellate review because their
sentences ran from the date adjudged whether served or not.126 The
Code now provides that a commander may "defer" the service of a sen-
tence to confinement by releasing an accused pending completion of
appellate review.127 The discretion to release rests with the appropriate
convening authority.128
Sentencing
In its Standards Relating to Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures,29
the American Bar Association has made a number of proposals relating
to the important and difficult task of sentencing an offender after con-
viction. The standards recognize that sentencing is extremely diffi-
cult and should be handled by the trial judge rather than the jury. 30
Prior to enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968, all sentencing at
courts-martial was done by the court-members. The Military Justice
Act amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide that at
all general courts-martial, except in capital cases, la3 and at an specialcourts-martial to which a military judge has been detailed, 32 the accused
126. UCMJ art. 57, 10 U.S.C. § 857 (Supp. V, 1970).
127. Id. art. 57(d), 10 U.S.C. § 857(d) (Supp. V, 1970).
128. Id.
129. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELAT-
ING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATVFS AND PROCEDURES (Approved Draft 1968).
130. Id. at 13 (Standard 1.1).
131. UCMJ art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (Supp. V, 1970).
132. Id. arts. 18, 26(a), 10 U.S.C. § 818, 826(a) (Supp. V, 1970). The Code gives
the authority convening a special court, unless it adjudges a bad conduct discharge, dis-
cretion as to whether or not a military judge shall be detailed to the court. The pur-
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may request trial by the military judge alone. When the accused is tried
by the judge alone, the judge determines guilt or innocence and, if the
accused is convicted, imposes sentence. If the accused does not waive
trial by court-members, the sentence as well as the guilt or innocence is
determined by court-members. A bill introduced during the last session
of Congress133 proposed that sentencing power be transferred to the
military judge even where the accused does not request trial by military
judge alone. Such a change in the Uniform Code would bring military
practice more closely in line with most civilian jurisdictions and with
the American Bar Association recommendations. Sentencing involves
the extremely difficult job of determining the appropriate sentence for
the offender and the particular crime he has committed, and assuring that
the deterrent function of the law is carried out. This is an extremely
difficult task for the jury member to perform, because he does not have
the experience gained by the judge who presides over many cases in-
volving different offenders and offenses.
Judges
The extensive use of the Military Justice Act's provisions for trial by
judge alone3 4 highlights the importance of the independent military
judge concept which was introduced into statutory law by the Military
Justice Act of 1968.135 The independence of the military judge pro-
tects against the possibility of unlawful influence by the command on
the military justice process. The Code requires that military judges of
general courts-martial be designated for such duty by The Judge Advo-
cate General and be directly responsible to The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral or his designee. 136 What this means in practice is that military judges
of general courts-martial must be in a chain of command that rises di-
pose of this discretion was a realization that military judges would not always be avail-
able. The Code further provides an exception for detailing a military judge to a
court-martial which adjudges a bad conduct discharge. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819
(Supp. V, 1970). By regulation the Army has severely limited these exceptions. See
AR 27-10, paras. 2-15,-16 (May 27, 1969).
133. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1970).
134. See, REPORT OF THE JUDGE ADVOcATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE U.S. COURT OF Mi=ITRY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVOcATES GENERAL OF THE
ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION,
PURSUANT To Ti UCMJ, 20 (Jan. 1, 1969 to Dec. 31, 1969); see Moyer supra note 1, at
137, n. 244.
135. UCMJ art. 26(c), 10 US.C. § 826(c) (Supp. V, 1970). The "independent judici-
ary" concept was implemented by regulation in the Army in 1968. See Mounts and
Sugarman, The Military justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.A.J. 470, 471 (1969).
136. UCMJ art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
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rectly to The Judge Advocate General and is outside the chain of com-
mand of the authority who convenes the court-martial. The military
judge of a general court-martial is rated on his performance of duty by
officers in the military judge chain of command. The Uniform Code
does not require that military judges of special courts-martial be com-
pletely independent of the command. 3 7 Paragraph 38e of the Manual
for Courts-Martial provides, however, that the convening authority
shall not prepare or review any report concerning the effectiveness, fit-
ness, or efficiency of a military judge detailed to a special court-martial
which relates to his performance of duty as a military judge. In the case
of judges of general courts-martial, the convening authority is not per-
mitted to rate the judge on the performance of any of his duties.138
Viewing these provisions as a whole, they represent a compromise. The
ideal would be to have the special court-martial judge be a member of an
"independent judiciary," but the problems of providing judges for the
vast number and scattered locations of special courts-martial are formi-
dable. "'9 The independent judiciary concept should be extended to in-
clude those judges who preside over special courts-martial, and law or
regulations should require that these independent judicial officers pre-
side over all special, as well as general, courts-martial. Placing all judges
in this independent category would prevent a convening authority or
staff judge advocate from showing his displeasure with the judicial per-
formance of a military judge by unfairly downgrading him on the per-
formance of his other, nonjudicial, duties.
Appellate military judges, as well as all military judges of general
courts-martial, are required by the Code to be completely independent
of command channels. They are responsible only to The Judge Advo-
cate General or his designee. 40
Appellate military judges and military judges assigned to the inde-
pendent trial judiciary are about as independent as it is possible to make
judges within the military structure. Obviously they are not as inde-
pendent as a federal judge who has life tenure, but they are at least as
independent as the many state court judges who are elected to office.14'
137. Id. art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (Supp. V, 1970).
138. Id. art. 26(c), 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
139. In fiscal year 1969, there were 55,597 special courts-martial in the Army, 16,239
in the Navy, and 1733 in the Air Force. REPORT, supra note 134.
140. UCMJ art. 66, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (Supp. V, 1970).
141. The selection, training, and experience of military judges varies from one service
to another, but the Army is illustrative. All military judges of general courts-martial
and appellate military judges are officers serving in the grades of lieutenant colonel and
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CRITICISM
The most frequently heard criticisms of the military justice system
are directed at the role of the military commander in the military jus-
tice process. These criticisms may be included under the heading of
"unlawful command influence." Article 37 of the Uniform Code, which
was amended by the Military Justice Act of 1968,142 recognizes the po-
tential problem of influence by the commander in an unlawful manner
and specifically prohibits it. Violation of this article could subject an
individual to prosecution. 14 The Court of Military Appeals has been
quick, however, to invoke Article 37 to modify the result in a case
where even the appearance of unlawful influence was present. 44
Under military practice, the convening authority, the military com-
mander who convenes the court-martial, makes the ultimate decision
whether or not an individual will be prosecuted and by what type of
court-martial. This function is generally performed in civilian systems
by a prosecuting or district attorney, although in federal practice a grand
jury indictment will generally be required. 45 In his recently introduced
bill,' 41 Senator Bayh has proposed that this function be transferred to
a legal officer outside the chain of command. The current practice ap-
pears sufficiently circumscribed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice
and the Manual for Courts-Martial to make the proposed change un-
necessary. The convening authority may not refer a charge to a general
court-martial for trial unless he has found that the charge alleges an
offense and is warranted by evidence indicated in the report of investi-
gation, 47 and the convening authority must make similar findings be-
colonel. They have all had extensive experience in the field of military justice including
service as counsel of courts-martial and in many cases as staff judge advocates of general
court-martial jurisdictions. All military judges certified by The Judge Advocate General
of the Army must attend a three-week course for military judges given at The Judge
Advocate General's School, Charlottesville, Virginia. Military judge seminars, fre-
quently of a combined service type, are held regularly. Military judges of special courts-
martial are majors and senior captains with extensive trial experience. They receive the
same training and attend the same seminars as military judges of general courts-martial.
A military career pattern starting with assignment as counsel at courts-martial and pro-
gressing through assignments as a special court-martial military judge, general court-
martial military judge and appellate military judge should develop military judges who
have the training and experience required to perform their most difficult jobs.
142. UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (Supp. V, 1970).
143. See id. art. 98, 10 U.S.C. § 898 (1964).
144. See, e.g., United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967).
145. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
146. S. 4191, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
147. UCMJ art. 34, 10 U.S.C. § 834 (1964).
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fore referring charges to a summary or special court-martial.14 If a con-
vening authority has other than an official interest in the case, as when he
swears to charges, he is precluded from referring a case to trial.149
When a convening authority refers a case to trial, it indicates no more
than that the convening authority believes the charges to be serious and
that there is evidence indicating that the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused should be determined by court-martial. The convening author-
ity's power in this area gives him the authority not to prosecute an in-
dividual if he determines that this course of action would best serve the
public interest.
In the military, the court-members (jury) are not selected at random.
The convening authority selects them from the members of his com-
mand. 5 ' An enlisted accused may, upon request, have at least one-third
of the court-members also be enlisted men.' 5' Selection of court-mem-
bers by other than random process is required to enable the commander
to be assured that members of his command needed for military duties
will not be unavailable because of court duty. Because the members of
courts-martial are selected by the individual who determines that prose-
cution is warranted, the assertion that members prone to convict will
be chosen by the commander has some plausibility; but it does not stand
up under scrutiny or in practice. The record is clear that the results of
such acts would bring on inexorable consequences. The Code con-
tains a number of provisions designed to protect the accused from get-
ting a stacked court panel. Peremptory challenges are limited,'5 2 but
the accused has an unlimited number of challenges for cause,5 3 and the
defense counsel has access to background information on court-members
and conducts the voir dire examination himself. The most telling argu-
ment against the assertion that court-members are selected to convict is
148. MCM 33.
149. See UCMJ art. 1(9), 10 U.S.C. § 801(9) (1964); MCM t 5a(3). Thus, a con-
vening authority may not convene a court-martial when he is the person actually mak-
ing the accusation in the case or when he directs someone else to make the accusation.
In this case, only a superior authority may convene the court for the trial of the case.
MCM 5a(3).
150. Members of a court-martial are not always members of the command of the
convening authority. The Navy, for example, has established law centers throughout
the world as a means of furnishing legal services, including the administration of justice,
for prescribed geographical areas. These areas are not always the same as command
areas of responsibility so the court-martial members may not be from the command
of the convening authority.
151. UCMJ art. 25(c), 10 U.S.C. § 825(c) (Supp. V, 1970).
152. Id. art. 41(b), 10 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Supp. V, 1970).
153. Id. art. 41(a), 10 U.S.C. § 841 (a) (Supp. V, 1970).
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the number of acquittals which result in the military. The table below
compares convictions by general court-martial in the Army with federal
court convictions.
COMPARISON OF CoNvIcTIoN RATES BY
GENERAL COURTS-MARTIAL AND IN FEDERAL COURTS
The following are the figures and rates for Fiscal Year 1969 and Fiscal
Year 1970 for General Courts-Martial in the Army: 1
54
FY 1969 FY 1970
Tried 2482 Tried 2628
Convicted 2323 Convicted 2449
Acquitted 159 Acquitted 179
Guilty Plea 1659 Guilty Plea 1853
Overall Conviction Rate: 94% Overall Conviction Rate: 93%
Contested Case Conviction Rate: Contested Case Conviction Rate:
82% 77%
The following are the FY 1969 figures and rates for the United States
District Courts: 5
Cases Tried 27,929
Convicted 26,803
Acquitted 1,126
Guilty Plea or Nolo 23,138
Contested Cases 4,791
Overall Conviction Rate: 96%
Contested Case Conviction Rate: 77%
Command influence is also asserted because the convening authority
reviews the case after completion of the trial. It is true that the com-
mander reviews the case, but his review may work only to the ad-
vantage, and not to the disadvantage, of the accused.15 6
154. Figures obtained from the Office of The Judge Advocate General of the Army.
155. ANNuAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, Table D4 (1969).
156. MCM 88. The strong policy against any attempts to exert command influence
on the military justice process is best expressed in a quotation from a speech given at
the 1970 American Bar Association Convention in St. Louis on August 11 by General
William C. Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff:
I do not mean to imply that justice should be meted out by the commander
who refers a case to trial or by anyone not duly constituted to fulfill a
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REFORM
The obvious tenor of this article has been to indicate that the author
believes the system of military justice as presently constituted provides
procedures and protections compatible in most respects with the stand-
ards formulated by the American Bar Association and which equal or
surpass the civilian systems of criminal justice in the United States.
There are, however, areas in need of reform which deserve discussion.
Selection of court-martial members by the convening authority, while
not abused, has been subjected to so much criticism that implementation
of a random selection system should be considered. Such a system
should include a provision, similar to that presently contained in Article
25, that no accused be tried by any person junior to him in rank or
grade without his consent, and the convening authority should have
complete discretion to strike from the randomly selected court-panel
those persons essential for a military mission.
Under current law, the convening authority is required to review the
findings, as well as the sentence, of a court-martial to determine that
they are correct in law and fact.5 7 The provision regarding sentence
review permits the commander to exercise clemency in favor of the
accused. This provision should be retained to expedite return to duty
of a rehabilitated accused and to permit the other benefits of clemency
action to be achieved. The commander's review of findings is in addi-
tion to the legal review provided by a trained lawyer.1 8 It is a time
consuming procedure which the convening authority cannot adequately
perform since he generally is not a lawyer. This procedure could well
be removed from military practice.
Under the Code as presently written, the convening authority is also
required to perform certain other functions which are strictly legal in
nature.15 9 Under Article 62, if a military judge dismisses a specification
before a court-martial on motion, and the ruling does not amount to
a finding of not guilty, the convening authority may review the de-
cision and may order the court to reconsider the decision.160 Military
law should be amended to provide a proper judicial procedure for re-
viewing interlocutory rulings of the trial judge which effectively termi-
judicial role. A military trial should not have a dual function as an instru-
ment of discipline and as an instrument of justice. It should be an instru-
ment of justice and in fulfilling this function it will promote discipline.
157. UCMJ art. 64, 10 U.S.C. § 864 (1964).
158. See notes 107, 113 supra and accompanying text.
159. UCMJ art. 63, 10 U.S.C. § 863 (1964).
160. Id. art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 862 (a) (1964); MCM 67f.
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nate the prosecution but do not amount to a finding of not guilty.
Under federal law, if a district judge dismisses a charge, the United
States Attorney may petition the circuit court for a review of this de-
cision.'
Appellate review of courts-martial presents another area in need of
reform. Under current law, decisions of the United States Court of
Military Appeals may not be reviewed directly by the United States
Supreme Court. The accused must start his appellate procedure anew
in the federal district court. The government, too, is precluded from
seeking further review of an adverse decision of the Court of Military
Appeals. The procedure is time consuming and wasteful. When a sig-
nificant decision such as O'Callahan v. Parker0 2 is decided by the Su-
preme Court, it may be a number of years before questions left un-
answered by the decision are finally resolved. 6 1 Congress should enact
legislation to permit the Supreme Court, in its discretion, to review the
decisions of the Court of Military Appeals when they involve the ques-
tion of the jurisdiction of a court-martial over the offense or the
offender.
Certain constitutional questions would be presented by such legisla-
tion. Article III, section 2, clause 2, of the Constitution defines the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and divides it between original and
appellate jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
can neither be enlarged nor restricted. 6 4 The appellate jurisdiction of
the Court is subject to the control of Congress,6 5 but congressional
power is not absolute in this regard. Article III, section 2, clause 1, pro-
vides that "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
• . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party . ... "
Review by the Supreme Court outside the original jurisdiction must be
on appeal, and the decision to be reviewed must have involved a pro-
ceeding which was judicial in nature and admits of a final judgment.
161. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (Supp. IV, 1968). For appropriate guidelines, see ABA PROJECt
ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JuSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO CRIMINAL AP-
PEALS 33, 34 (Standard 1.4) (Tentative Draft 1968).
162. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
163. See, e.g., Relford v. Commandant, 39 U.S.L.W. 4240 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1971), which
answered the question of whether the decision in O'Callahan v. Parker applies retro-
actively and on a military installation. The Court's ruling appeared to strictly limit the
applicability of O'Callahan.
164. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173 (1803).
165. U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
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It is not important whether such a proceeding was originally
begun by an administrative or executive determination, if when it
comes to the court, whether legislative or constitutional, it calls
for the exercise of only the judicial power of the court upon which
jurisdiction has been conferred by law . . . . By cases or contro-
versies are intended the claims of litigants brought before the
courts for determination by such regular proceedings as are estab-
lished by law or custom for the protection or enforcement of
rights, or the prevention, redress, or punishment of wrongs....
The term implies the existence of present or possible adverse
parties whose contentions are submitted to the court for adjudica-
tion.166
The Court of Military Appeals is a court created under the provisions
of Article I rather than Article III of the Constitution. 167 The Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals which are now
Article III courts were originally Article I courts, and their decisions
were reviewable on appeal by the Supreme Court.168 At the present
time, there are no Article I courts whose decisions are directly review-
able by the Supreme Court. Decisions of the Tax Court are reviewed
by Circuit Courts and then may be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 6
The same process is used to review the decisions of many administrative
agencies. 70 The reason for this two-step process is interesting. Since
the decisions of administrative agencies may not be final and may in-
volve administrative proceedings, they do not come within the judicial
power of the United States and hence cannot be reviewed on appeal by
the Supreme Court. Review of these decisions by the lower federal
courts is limited by statute to questions of law, with findings of fact to
be upheld if supported by substantial evidence-a legal question. By
this process, the proceedings before the lower court become judicial and
may ultimately be reviewed by the Supreme Court.'7' This same process
has been suggested for review of Court of Military Appeals decisions by
the Supreme Court although no explanation is given as to why it is
necessary. 72
The two-step process does not seem necessary. Decisions of the Court
166. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 722, 723, 724 (1929).
167. UCMJ art. 67(a) (1), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (1) (Supp. IV, 1968).
168. DeGroot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1866).
169. 26 U.S.C. § 7483 (1964).
170. See, K. DAvis, ADmiNirrm~nVE LAw 442 (1965).
171. C. WaGHT, HANDBOOK OF rTE LAw or FEDERAL COuRTS 43 (1963).
172. Keefe, Reactions to Current Legal Literature, 56 A3B.A.J. 188, 193 (1970).
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of Military Appeals are final and judicial in nature. In Noyd v. Bond,.73
the Supreme Court indicated at least a notion that it could be given
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Court of Military Appeals. "It
is for these reasons that Congress, in the exercise of its power to 'Make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces'
has never given this court appellate jurisdiction to supervise the ad-
ministration of criminal justice in the Military."
Two provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice may cloud
the finality of the Court of Military Appeals decisions. Article 71 (a)174
requires approval by the President of death sentences and sentences in-
volving general or flag officers. Article 71(b) 175 requires approval of
the service Secretary for sentences extending to dismissal of officers.
These sentences are, therefore, not absolutely final when approved by
the Court of Military Appeals. However, since the President and Secre-
taries have no power to affect the findings of the court-martial, their
actions are much more akin to the clemency powers of the President in
federal cases and state governors in state cases.
CONCLUSION
There is a high order of justice in our military system of justice. Pro-
fessional military leaders and their lawyers who constitute the Judge
Advocate General's Corps' of the services have not been content to
maintain the status quo. They have been in the forefront of progress
in developing a legal system designed to meet the exigencies of the
time. The present high quality of military justice has evolved from the
crucible of extended experience.
That experience clearly documents the need for a special system
designed to meet the specialized problems of the military, functioning
within the military establishment, and moving progressively to a status
of independence. But, in the development of that system, the military
leaders themselves have sought to bring military justice within the ambit
of civilian justice. In fact, they have been in the vanguard, implement-
ing the more enlightened views of the bench and bar. One needs only
to study the Manual for Courts-Martial and the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice to conclude that most of the applicable principles of the
American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice are now a
reality in the unified system of military justice.
173. 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969).
174. UCMJ art. 71(a), 10 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1964).
175. Id. art. 71 (b), 10 U.S.C. § 871 (b) (1964).
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Beyond that, the professionalization of the military legal services has
been rising steadily despite many adverse circumstances and a growing
work load that is closely akin to the burdens brought on by sheer volume
in our fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system. In
fact, the concept of continuing legal education by military lawyers is a
greater reality than in the civilian bar.
To be sure, the military system is not perfect-no system can be per-
fect as long as it is operated by human beings. What is important is to
provide safeguards against human error, and it is clear that military
leaders and lawyers have a high degree of motivation in this area. If
the past is any criterion for the future, then we may expect to witness
continued improvement of our system of military justice.
